

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.130

10 May 1963

ENGLISH

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

AUG 13 1963

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTIETH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Friday, 10 May 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

(Poland)

63-14801

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. J.F.M. BELL.

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Mr. C.T. STONE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA

Mr. V. PECHOTA

Mr. A. MIKULIN

Mr. J. BLAZIK

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU

Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI

Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU

Mr. L.C.N. OBJ

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. N. ECOERESCU

Mr. S. SERBANESCU

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von PLATEN

Mr. E. CORNELL

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A.A. ROSHCIN

Mr. M.V. ANTIASOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. S. AHMED

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN

Mr. J.M. EDES

Mr. R.C. BEETHAM

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. A.L. RICHARDS

Mr. D.E. MARK

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): I declare open the one hundred and thirtieth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): Romanians always begin their fairy-tales with the phrase: "Once upon a time, if ever...". I feel tempted to begin my statement today in the same manner: "Once upon a time, if ever," there was a common understanding among us on the nature of collateral measures. That was once upon a time. It was, because it is no longer.

At our meeting of 3 May (ENDC/PV.127, pp.5 et seq.) I stressed the point of view of the Romanian delegation concerning the nature of collateral measures which are to be discussed within the framework of our Conference. It was not our intention to revert to that issue today, but, as the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, and the Canadian representative, Mr. Burns, who spoke after me on that occasion, approached the problem from an angle which differed from our common decisions, I have found it appropriate to return once more to the character and nature of collateral measures. Repetitio mator studiorum.

At that meeting the United States representative contended with regard to collateral measures that the attention of our Conference must be focussed on the following problems:

"... how to control the existing arms confrontation, how to halt the arms race, how to reduce and eliminate the weapons of war." (ENDC/PV.127, p.27)
That statement by Mr. Stelle invites the remark that the United States delegation is ignoring the provisions of our decision of 23 May 1962, which defines in all clarity the nature of collateral measures within the compass of this Conference. I am compelled to recall once again that those provisions establish unequivocally that we are called upon to examine --

"... various proposals on the implementation of measures aimed at: the lessening of international tension; the consolidation of confidence among States; and facilitating general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/1/Add.1)

It follows, therefore, that collateral measures need not necessarily bear exclusively on disarmament. Of course, we can examine and adopt agreements on one or other of the problems pertaining to disarmament within the framework of collateral measures. That is obvious. But from that conclusion there emerges also a second conclusion which is essential to the subject with which we are concerned. Our

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

Conference has the right and the obligation to examine and adopt measures collateral to disarmament which -- and the term "collateral" strongly emphasizes this --, while they are not disarmament measures stricto sensu, are of such a nature as to lessen international tension, to generate and enhance confidence among States, and to facilitate the implementation of the primary task entrusted to this Committee by mankind: general and complete disarmament. In brief, when we speak of collateral measures, we have in view confidence-building measures which should create favourable conditions for the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

That precisely was the premise we started from when, at the beginning of our Conference, the decision on collateral measures was adopted. Delegations belonging to both parties here have expressed themselves to that effect. May I be allowed to refresh the memory of my colleagues by quoting some of those statements?

On 15 March 1962 the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, stated:

"While the Soviet Government regards the preparation of an agreement on general and complete disarmament as the Committee's main task it would nevertheless consider it useful if a number of measures which would facilitate the relaxation of international tension, the strengthening of confidence among States and the creation of more favourable conditions for disarmament were taken forthwith, without awaiting the completion of the negotiations on general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/PV.2, p.12)

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico, Mr. Tello, stated on 22 March 1962: "Nevertheless, I believe it is not possible, even without disarmament measures,... to adopt other methods of reducing international tension and paving the way for general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/PV.7, p.8)

Lastly, I should like to quote one more statement, by Mr. Segni, then Foreign Minister and now President of the Republic of Italy. On 16 March 1962 Mr. Segni said:

"I deem it necessary, therefore, to insist on the absolute need for restoring among us as soon as possible a climate of improved understanding and mutual confidence. The armaments race, as we know, is the offshoot of mutual fear and distrust, and creates that sinister spiral with which, unfortunately, we are all too well acquainted. We must, above all, put an end to this trend by avoiding every move, every action, which may carry the implication of intimidation or threat, and by confirming our undertaking

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

to resolve existing problems through peaceful negotiation in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. Once the trend has been stopped it will be possible to reverse it." (ENDC/PV.3, p.14)

Though our opinion about the causes of the armaments race differs from that of the Italian delegation, we still cannot help stressing the importance of the statement I have just quoted from the point of view of the problem we are tackling.

I might go on to give further quotations, but I would rather stop there. The statements I have reproduced are quite significant. They throw additional light on the nature of the collateral measures which have to be included in the area of preoccupation of our Conference. They show beyond question that once upon a time there was a clear understanding by all delegations on the nature of collateral measures. There was, once upon a time -- or was there not such an understanding then, either?

Today we are offered a new concept; we are given a new definition of collateral measures (ENDC/PV.125, pp.18-20) which is not consonant with the decision taken by this Committee on 23 March 1962.

What underlies that trend that we have been witnessing for some time? My delegation has reached the conclusion that some seek to prevent the examination, within the framework of our Committee of the proposal made by the Soviet Union to conclude a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty (ENDC/77).

What is the reason for seeking to prevent the conclusion of such a non-aggression pact? There are several causes, and they are of different kinds. There are causes of a general nature, as well as causes of a particular nature. They stem from the Western nuclear Powers' concept of international relations, the international situation and the methods to be employed in solving international disputes; and they stem also from the way in which the Western nuclear Powers wish to impose certain interests on the European continent.

The Romanian delegation reserves its right to discuss those causes in greater detail at an appropriate time, although we hope that it will not be necessary to do so and that the Western delegations will revise their present stand and begin in this Committee to negotiate a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries. Until that time, however, the Romanian delegation wants to call the attention of all representatives here to two dangers we may incur if we accept the concept of collateral measures advanced by the United States delegation and supported by the delegation of Canada, and if we do not disapprove the methods used by those delegations.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

The first danger is that, were we to accept the artificial definition of collateral measures given by Mr. Stelle, it could be invoked not only in connexion with the proposal for a NATO-Warsaw Treaty pact but also in connexion with any of the collateral measures on the agenda of our Committee (ENDC/C.1/2), or those which may still be put forward.

The second danger is that, were we to accept the methods employed by the United States delegation -- that is, the attempt to revise a common decision taken previously then the area of revisions could be extended to all our previous decisions. That would mean that we had been doing the work of Sisyphus -- that all our labours during a whole year had been brought to naught. I think I need not stress further why the Romanian delegation cannot accept either the definition or the methods employed by the United States delegation. Neither is of such a nature as to advance our negotiations.

Now a few remarks on the objections voiced by the United States and Canadian delegations to the examination within the framework of our Conference of the proposal to conclude a non-aggression pact between the NATO States and the Warsaw Treaty States. At our meeting on Friday last Mr. Stelle took up an objection previously advanced (ENDC/PV.110, p.42) by the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, that the pact would represent only a "... re-affirmation of some of the existing obligations of States under the United Nations Charter ...". (ENDC/PV.127, p.26)

In fact, the non-aggression pact would reaffirm two of the cardinal obligations incumbent upon States according to contemporary international law in general, and under the United Nations Charter in particular: the obligation not to resort to the threat or the use of force in relations between States, and the obligation to solve international disputes exclusively by peaceful means.

If that is so, then what is the difference between the viewpoint of the socialist delegations and that advocated by the Western delegations? The difference is that in the non-aggression pact we see, not a mere reiteration of the obligations under the United Nations Charter, but a **materialization** of those obligations, a special application of them to the relations between the NATO States and the Warsaw Treaty States. Thus the pact would represent concrete proof of the resolve of the States to live in peace with each other, an expression of the policy of peaceful co-existence, a significant legal, political and moral instrument against aggressive schemes.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

The Western delegations are presenting matters as if the pact would in practice yield nothing beyond the mere reiteration of certain obligations under the United Nations Charter. That, of course, does not fit in with reality, and no objective observer in this room or outside could possibly reach such a conclusion.

Let us assume, however, that the pact would represent only a mere reiteration of the obligations under the United Nations Charter. Even when formulated upon that hypothesis, the objection of the Western delegations is groundless. At an earlier meeting I referred (ENDC/PV.115, p.12) to the fact that it is current practice in the relations between States to reaffirm in political treaties obligations deriving from the United Nations Charter. By that means the obligations are strengthened and can on no account become weaker.

This view of the relationship between the provisions of the United Nations Charter and those of treaties between two or more States is not ours alone. In this connexion I should recall a statement made by the representative of Italy, Mr. Carlo Russo, on 5 April 1962 with regard to the prohibition of war propaganda. Mr. Russo said:

"To begin with, what principles should we include in a formal pledge? In my opinion we should refer first and foremost to the Charter of the United Nations, which binds us to abstain from the use of force and threats in international relations." (ENDC/C.I/PV.2, p.23)

In the light of that statement by the Italian representative it appears logical to ask how it happens that in some cases we are offered a plea -- and rightly so -- for the re-statement of the obligations of the Charter, while when it comes to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact it is claimed, expressly or by implication, that that would be a futile exercise.

At our meeting of 3 May Mr. Stelle again pleaded (ENDC/PV.127, p.27) the political character of the non-aggression pact. I do not intend to dwell in detail on that objection. I revealed its groundlessness at the same meeting (ibid., pp. 6 et seq.). Today I should like to stress once again that our problems in this Conference are essentially political. There is not a single issue which does not have a definite political character and great political significance. When the representative of the United States wishes us to understand that examination of a non-aggression pact by this Conference would be tantamount to leading the Conference along the path of discussing each and every political problem existing in the world today, we should only like to tell him that that is simply an erroneous understanding of the matter.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

Indeed, what did Mr. Stelle say on 3 May? He said:

"The world is filled with political problems and there is urgent need for their solution. But can it realistically be contended that this Conference is to be the forum for solution of each and every one of the world's political problems? What, then, would become of our efforts to devote our attention to the task of making progress on disarmament? Is disarmament to be brushed aside?" (ENDC/PV.127, p.27)

That there are many political problems in the world today which await settlement is self-evident. But who ever suggested, and when, that each and every one of those problems should be discussed and solved in this Committee?

As for the concern voiced by the United States representative about the progress of the negotiations on general and complete disarmament, I venture to ask what are the grounds for his assumption that the discussion of such an important political problem as the conclusion of the non-aggression pact would be tantamount to the weakening of our efforts for disarmament. Of course, he does not state that expressis verbis in connexion with the pact, but his allusion is clear to everyone.

The examination of the proposal regarding a non-aggression pact is not, and cannot be, of such a nature as to impede our efforts to attain disarmament. Quite the contrary. The representative of Canada Mr. Burns, in his turn, declared that

"... in order to make progress towards our goal of a total disarmament programme, our efforts should be concentrated on those areas where agreement can be quickly reached and come into force prior to a general disarmament agreement." (ibid., p.13)

Judging by that assertion of Mr. Burns, it should not be difficult for the Canadian delegation to proceed to a constructive examination of the draft and then to place its signature on the non-aggression pact. If the Western Powers cherish a desire to reach agreement on the pact, it "can be quickly reached and come into force prior to a general disarmament agreement."

Commenting on the proposal to conclude the non-aggression pact, Mr. Burns made a number of points which deserve our closest attention simply because they are of such a nature as not to promote examination of the pact, but rather to hinder us in all our work.

Referring to the intervention of the Romanian delegation on 3 May 1963, the representative of Canada contended that:

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

".. the pact proposed by the Soviet Union is not conceived merely as a measure collateral to general and complete disarmament but is also closely related to very far-reaching and extremely important political problems of a different character." (ibid., p.19)

At that meeting I stated (ibid., p.12) that we should like to hear the specific reasons why the Western Powers are rejecting the idea of negotiating the NATO-Warsaw Treaty non-aggression pact. Mr. Burns has answered that there are "very far-reaching and extremely important political problems of a different character". May I ask one question: What is the opinion of the representative of Canada? Are those problems to be solved by means of aggression or by means of non-aggression? Awaiting his answer, I should like to remind the Canadian representative that article 2 of the draft NATO-Warsaw Treaty non-aggression pact proposed by the Soviet Union reads as follows:

"All disputes that may arise between one or more States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, on the one hand, and one or more States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, on the other hand, shall be resolved by peaceful means only, through negotiations between the parties concerned or by using other means for the pacific settlement of international disputes as provided for by the United Nations Charter." (ENDC/77)

In conclusion, perhaps I may recall a statement by the Foreign Minister of Nigeria, Mr. Wachuku, who said in this Committee on 23 March 1962:

"It is the considered opinion of my delegation that if we hope to inspire confidence and trust between the two great Power blocs involved in these negotiations, no stone should be left unturned to remove as far as possible all those cold-war elements that have in the past poisoned the relationship between the two political and economic systems represented by the United States and the Western Powers, on the one hand, and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Warsaw Pact countries, on the other.

"We must persuade the two Power blocs to accept the principle of co-existence not only in theory but also in practice." (ENDC/PV.8, p.8)

The socialist countries have shown on numerous occasions that to them the principle of peaceful co-existence is not merely a theory but is being translated into fact. A sound proof of this is the draft NATO-Warsaw Treaty non-aggression pact submitted by the Government of the Soviet Union, a draft which clearly represents an embodiment of the principle of peaceful co-existence.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

Convinced of that truth, the delegation of the Romanian People's Republic again demands that the proceedings of this Committee should be devoted immediately to discussion, paragraph by paragraph, of the draft non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): In connexion with our debate I have been re-reading the contributions which the representative of the Soviet Union made to our discussions both on Friday last, 3 May, and on the previous Friday, 26 April. On those occasions Mr. Tsarapkin developed a theme to which he has referred several times recently, and one which I think requires some answer.

On 3 May Mr. Tsarapkin said:

"When we compare what is happening here in the Committee, what the representatives of the Western Powers are saying here, with what the Western Powers are doing outside the Committee, then, of course, it is impossible to make any other appraisal or draw any other conclusion than that contained in our statement at the meeting of the Committee on 26 April. In their speeches the representatives of the Western Powers use such words as "balance", "reality", and "sense of perspective". What "perspective" are you speaking of? The perspective of bringing the world to the brink of a nuclear missile catastrophe. We are opposed to such a perspective, and we will continue to make every effort to unmask the position of the Western Powers and to prevent, as far as lies within our power, a dangerous development of events in the direction of war, towards which the Western Powers are pushing the world."

(ENDC/PV.127, p.29)

That is what Mr. Tsarapkin said on Friday last; and on the previous Friday he said:

"Outside the Eighteen-Nation Committee the Western Powers are carrying on a frenzied arms race and are engaged in intensive military preparations which become more extensive from day to day."(ENDC/PV.125, p.23)

That, as I have said, is a theme which our Soviet colleague has referred to on a number of occasions recently, and he has used it in justification for the reluctance of the Soviet Union to allow itself to be drawn into serious negotiation, whether it be in the realm of general and complete disarmament or -- and it is this we are more specifically considering today -- in the realm of measures designed to reduce tension in the initial stages leading into our programme for general and complete disarmament.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

I think it important that we should get our views on this matter clearly into perspective. We in the United Kingdom deplore the arms race as deeply as anybody, either inside or outside this Conference. We want to see it halted. We are willing to join in any agreed measures to reduce tension immediately. We stand ready and anxious to develop urgently our plans in the field of general and complete disarmament. But we must face the fact, however unpalatable it may be, that until we can reach agreement here, either in the more limited field of collateral measures or in the wider aspect of general and complete disarmament, States will feel bound to develop their armed potential.

What we lack in the world today, as I have said many times before in this Conference, is confidence. That, regrettably enough, is so today just as it was when we started our discussions in March last year. It is so today just as it was in September 1961 when we approved the agreed principles (ENDC/5) which form the background to this Conference.

Every State, and particularly the two Powers which are leaders of the great Power blocs in the world today, is determined that while this deplorable arms race continues it shall not be left behind. This is not a one-sided issue, as the Soviet representative so often claims. The fears and apprehensions to which he gives voice are just as great on our side as they are on his. The Committee well remembers that at the very moment when, in the United Nations in 1961, we approved and welcomed the agreed principles to which I have referred, the world was still reverberating to the Soviet unilateral resumption of nuclear testing after a truce of three years. The Committee well remembers that shortly after we had approved those agreed principles the Soviet Union, in defiance and contempt of the strongly-expressed wishes of the General Assembly of the United Nations, exploded the largest nuclear device that has ever been known.

That did not deter the Western nations from agreeing to sit down with the Soviet Union and to try to reach agreement with it, either on the halting of nuclear tests or on the wider issue of general and complete disarmament. When we assembled for this Conference in March of last year, it was in the knowledge that the Soviet Union, no less than the United States was increasing its armaments. That did not lead us to believe that our Conference was doomed to failure; on the contrary, it led us to the belief that it was essential to make progress and thus to halt this gloomy race.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

In the charges which our Soviet colleague has bandied about so freely in recent weeks, he has talked a great deal about the build-up of Western and, particularly, United States armed strength, but he has not reminded us what the Soviet position is in all this. There are many interesting facts which he could have told us. The Soviet Union does not, of course, display all the facts relating to its armed strength as freely as do the Western Powers; but every representative sitting here knows that at this moment the Soviet Union maintains the largest armed force of any country represented at this Conference. Every representative here knows that the Soviet Union has developed the largest nuclear weapons in the world. Every representative knows that it is developing at high speed its fleet of submarines and, in particular, its nuclear submarines, including nuclear submarines with a capability of firing missiles with nuclear warheads. The Soviet representative himself has informed us (ENDC/PV.120, p.37), on the authority of no less a person than Marshal Malinovsky, that the Soviet Union has built up its nuclear capability to something at least equal to that of the West, and we all know that the Soviet Union's budgetary expenditure on its armed forces is not falling but rising.

In addition to all that, every representative here knows that in the late summer of last year the Soviet Union took steps which could have led to the extension of the threat of nuclear war to a whole new hemisphere. I refer, of course, to the events in the Caribbean last autumn. It is true that the Soviet Union subsequently agreed to withdraw its missiles, but the fact remains that the plans which it was then developing were in direct contravention of any thought of limiting and reducing the nuclear threat. And all that was done while its representative was participating actively in this Conference with us.

In spite of all those facts, neither the United Kingdom delegation nor the other Western delegations spend all their time here abusing the Soviet Union or accusing it of not wanting to reach disarmament. Admittedly we are acutely discouraged, only too often, by the attitude which the Soviet representative takes -- I fear with ever greater frequency -- in our discussions with him; but we recognize, while we deplore it, that this Conference cannot influence the build-up of Soviet armed strength until we have reached firm agreements, which we shall then expect the Soviet Union to honour.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

I have no desire to dwell on those gloomy facts, and indeed I should not emphasize them at all but for the continued references by the Soviet representative to Western developments of modern armaments. I emphasize the position now only in order to show that, however deplorable we may consider it, it is something in which the Soviet Union is as deeply implicated as any other country at this Conference. Therefore I say to the Soviet representative, please do not let us have a continuation of the accusations against the West on the assumption that the rest of us are unaware of what the Soviet Union itself is doing.

What we should be doing on both sides is to realize that the continuation of the process of the development of other newer and more deadly arms should concentrate the minds of all of us on finding an agreed way to halt the arms race. To pretend that the Soviet Union is more innocent than others in that field merely throws doubts on the sincerity of the whole Soviet approach to the matter.

So I repeat: let us try to get away from statements which seem designed solely to exacerbate the atmosphere at this Conference; let us get back to serious consideration of measures to reduce tension in the world; let us renew our efforts to make real progress in the tremendous tasks which confront us in general and complete disarmament.

I have felt compelled to speak on these lines this morning because of the attempts of the Soviet representative to distort the present position out of all recognition. But I want to get back to more constructive issues, and to come now to consider further some of the collateral measures which are before the Conference again today.

I wish it were otherwise, but I feel that there is not very much I can add this morning to what the United Kingdom delegation has already said about the two measures proposed by our Soviet colleagues. The Committee will remember that on 29 March (ENDC/PV.115, pp. 36 et seq.) the leader of my delegation, Mr. Godber, dealt with the Soviet draft declaration on bases (ENDC/75) in some detail, and pointed out that because of its obvious one-sidedness such a measure would increase rather than reduce international tension and mistrust. I am bound to say that, although we have listened carefully to what has been said since on that subject, we have heard nothing which has allowed us to change that view.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

The other measure proposed by our Soviet colleagues is the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries (ENDC/77). I shall not now go into the argument which our Romanian colleague has put forward (supra, p.3) concerning the relationship which such a pact might be deemed to have to the obligations of Members of the United Nations under the Charter. I think the argument which Mr. Macovescu used is worth studying carefully, and I propose to study it carefully when I read it in the verbatim record.

What I do wish to do is to refer, as indeed our Romanian colleague referred, (supra, p.10), to the remarks made on 3 May by the Canadian representative when he said (ENDC/PV.127, p.18) -- my phrasing of this is perhaps slightly different from Mr. Macovescu's, but I think it is a fair summary -- that in his view a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact countries might possibly be appropriate at some point in the context of an East-West understanding on the broader question of security arrangements in Central Europe.

I think, as I say, that that is a fair summary of Mr. Burns's argument, and his comments are comments with which I wish to associate myself. It seems to me that what we should hope for is that East-West relations in Europe, which is the major area of confrontation, might improve to the point where an arrangement of that kind between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries could form, as it were, a coping-stone to those improved relations. At such a moment -- and I am sure we must all earnestly hope that it may speedily be reached -- it might well be proper to look carefully at the terms of a draft on that subject.

I should like now to turn for a moment to the two collateral-measures proposals which have been made by the United States and which remain on the table (ENDC/C.1/2), and to emphasize once again their permissive character, a feature of them to which our United States colleague and I have frequently drawn attention in the past. I am afraid I have not been able to understand the arguments -- so often cited against them -- that they are measures whose sole purpose is that they should be used effectively for espionage, or measures calculated to increase international tension. I simply cannot understand those arguments. And the only other argument which we have heard urged against them is that they are too modest. I have already said on previous occasions that we ought to be glad if we could make progress even on small points.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

Having heard the comments of the Eastern European representatives on the two United States proposals, I cannot help feeling that there is a considerable degree of misunderstanding about the real purpose and nature of those measures, and that the allegations about them are based on that misunderstanding. I wonder, therefore, whether the time may not have come when more progress on them might be possible in informal private discussions between the two co-Chairmen. I merely offer that as a suggestion, but I have very much in mind the helpful comment of the Indian representative at our meeting on 8 May, when he said that --

"it would be a great mistake for either side to regard the difference of approach of the other side towards disarmament problems as synonymous with insincerity ..." (ENDC/PV.129, p.16)

I entirely agree with Mr. Lall, and I am sure he will allow me to add that his remarks should be applied equally to our respective approaches on collateral problems.

May I end my observations this morning with two remarks in a somewhat more optimistic tone? First, I should like to record the great satisfaction of the United Kingdom delegation that, as we understand it, detailed technical discussions have been taking place privately between Soviet and United States representatives following the agreement at our meeting on 5 April (ENDC/PV.118, pp.52, 55) to establish a direct communications link between their two Governments. I very much hope that those discussions will lead in the near future to a concrete agreement -- one which will not only be useful in itself but will also provide us with a helpful precedent and a stimulus for our future work in the field of collateral measures. It is true that a measure of that sort may be modest; but, as I have said, modesty seems to me to be no handicap. The measure does provide a sound first step, and it is one with which the United Kingdom may wish to be associated in due course.

I believe that as our discussions develop, given good will on all sides, we shall be able to agree on other collateral measures which, even if modest, will help to lessen tension and to increase international confidence.

That brings me to my second note of optimism when I say that I feel that we ought all to be encouraged in our work on collateral measures by the important proposal (ENDC/87) submitted at our meeting on 6 May by the representatives of Brazil and Mexico. As Mr. Godber said (ENDC/PV.128, p.25) that is a proposal on which the United Kingdom Government looks with considerable sympathy, as we shall continue to look with sympathy

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

on any proposal which will really help to reduce international tension and to build up confidence among States before the achievement of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Disarmament, in the widest sense of the term, is not a matter for major Powers alone, and I believe that the smaller Powers, especially the non-aligned Powers here, can each make and will each continue to make a positive contribution in these fields.

Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): Today I shall limit myself to a few remarks concerning the draft non-aggression pact between the NATO States and the Warsaw Treaty States. (ENDC/77).

I have already had the opportunity to explain my delegation's position in regard to certain measures aimed at lessening international tension and creating favourable conditions for the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. But certain arguments put forward in the statements of the Western delegations at our recent meetings oblige us to state our position more clearly still. I am referring mainly to statements by the representatives of the United States and Canada and their arguments against the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. The representative of Romania also drew attention to these statements this morning (supra, pp. 7 et seq.)

Although the question concerns a measure -- I am referring to the non-aggression pact -- which could be implemented without the slightest concession or sacrifice on the part of any party and which would yield its results immediately, the delegations of the Western Powers first replied to this constructive move on the part of the Soviet Union with an embarrassed silence or wholesale rejection, without any acceptable explanation whatsoever. Significant in this respect was the statement made at our meeting of 26 April by the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, who stated the following about the draft pact:

"The United States delegation has, of course, expressed its view (ENDC/PV.100, p.50) that one of the Soviet proposals, that concerning a non-aggression pact (ENDC/77) between the members of NATO and the members of the Warsaw Pact Organization, is inappropriate for discussion in this Committee.

"We are concerned in this Committee with matters relating to disarmament and to the control of armaments. We are not here seized of general political problems, and we are particularly not seized of those problems specifically related to European regional security matters. We have stated that view frankly and openly, and we would hope that the Soviet delegation would understand that fact." (ENDC/PV.125, p.20)

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What strikes one in Mr. Stelle's statement is the ease with which he passes sentence on a problem which the present international situation itself has placed on our agenda. The United States representative passes over in complete silence the most important aspect of the Soviet draft: the establishment of appropriate guarantees that the present military and political situation in the relations between the two most heavily armed groups confronting each other will not worsen still further and thus increase the fateful risk of a nuclear conflagration, which is constantly threatening mankind. In these circumstances how can one say that such a measure is inappropriate for discussion in our Committee? In addition to the question of general and complete disarmament, our Committee is empowered to discuss concrete measures aimed at lessening international tension and facilitating progress in our disarmament negotiations.

Incidentally, in his statement at our meeting of 26 April Mr. Stelle expressed himself in favour of considering measures that can, without upsetting the existing military relationship, reduce the risk of war, begin the process of halting the arms race, or initiate arms reduction. (*ibid.*) Yes, indeed: to halt the arms race and begin real negotiations on general and complete disarmament in an atmosphere of confidence is in our opinion truly an urgent task, for the fulfilment of which it is necessary to use all suitable means. Precisely from this point of view, it is impossible to deny that, as a result of concluding a non-aggression pact between the member States of the two groups, one of the main stimuli of the present arms race would be eliminated. The direct intrinsic connexion between a non-aggression pact and the creation of the necessary conditions for fruitful negotiations on disarmament measures is quite obvious, and no one -- except perhaps the delegations of the NATO countries -- will deny it.

Obviously this is a political problem. The same is true of other concrete measures which are being considered by our Committee. But this is not at all a regional problem, as Mr. Stelle tries to maintain, but a measure the effect of which would be manifested mainly in a general improvement in the international atmosphere. A pact would find a use not only on the European regional scale -- although it is in this region that the most dangerous foci of nuclear war are to be found -- but in all regions of the world where there are situations which affect the interests, of the two sides and may constitute a threat to world peace and security. In this connexion I

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should like to recall again that the obligation to renounce the use or threat of force, as provided for in article 1 of the draft non-aggression pact, must be equally applied both in the mutual relations between the States of the two groups and in international relations in general -- that is, in their relations with all other countries of the world.

The delegations of the socialist countries have already pointed out repeatedly that the arguments put forward by the Western Powers against discussion of the non-aggression pact in our Committee are far-fetched and designed to conceal the real motives of the Western Powers, which for tactical reasons they consider it inconvenient to emphasize. We have already said that it would be much better to call a spade a spade and to say frankly that the real reason for their opposition to this proposal is not the time or place of discussion of these questions, or other artificially devised reasons, but rather the reluctance of the Western Powers to renounce their designs in regard to the socialist countries.

I must state quite frankly that we are really grateful to the head of the Canadian delegation, Mr. Burns, for going, at our meeting of 3 May, beyond reservation of a general nature and making clear the real reason for the opposition of the Western delegations not only to the discussion of this question but to the draft itself (ENDC/PV.127, pp. 17 et seq.) Our Canadian colleague, Mr. Burns, like the representatives of other Western Powers, does not consider it appropriate that this draft should be discussed at our Conference; and by way of justifying his assertion he referred to that part of the telegram (ENDC/81) sent to our Committee by the Foreign Minister of the German Democratic Republic, Dr. Bolz, in which the idea of a pact was linked with the general question of security in Central Europe.

What is it precisely in the statement of the Foreign Minister of the German Democratic Republic that is not to the liking of our Western colleagues, including Mr. Burns? In the first place, they do not like the fact that, in order to reinforce the non-aggression pact, there is a proposal for the conclusion of an agreement between the two German States -- that is, between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic -- to renounce the use of force in their mutual relations and any attempt to alter the existing boundaries. Obviously not to the liking of the representatives of the West is also that part of the statement in which mention is made of the readiness of the Government of the German Democratic Republic to renounce

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the use of force in their mutual relations and any attempt to alter the existing boundaries. Obviously not to the liking of the representatives of the West is also that part of the statement in which mention is made of the readiness of the Government of the German Democratic Republic to renounce the use of nuclear weapons and to put an end to the armaments race if the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany agrees to similar measures.

This, it seems, is the crux of the matter. The Western Powers, of course, do not agree to these measures because their acceptance would run counter to their plans and intentions to change the situation brought about in Europe after the Second World War.

In this connexion I should like to revert again briefly to the statement of the Foreign Minister of the German Democratic Republic and to the proposals contained therein. Do these proposals threaten the security of any European or non-European State? Not at all. On the contrary, their purpose is to contribute to the lessening of international tension, the consolidation of peace and the elimination of one of the most dangerous sources of tension in Europe. If the Federal Republic of Germany were really such a peace-loving State as the representatives of the West try to depict it in our Committee, it ought to accept such proposals immediately and induce its NATO allies to do likewise.

But the situation is quite otherwise. I certainly have no intention of indulging in polemics, but I cannot help making a few remarks in this connexion with regard to the position taken by the Federal Republic of Germany. Every time, as soon as there is mention of the most urgent tasks of consolidating peace and normalizing and stabilizing the situation in Europe, the howls of the most inveterate opponents of such measures are heard coming from Bonn. So it was in the past during the discussion of all the important proposals put forward by the Soviet Union and the other socialist States, and so it is now with regard, for example, to the draft non-aggression pact. The spokesmen of German militarism, contrary to the real situation in the world and contrary to the interests of the German people itself, are stubbornly pursuing a policy running counter to peaceful co-existence and are set on the preparation of war without concealing their revanchist aims.

The Federal Republic of Germany is at present the only European State which openly puts forward territorial demands in regard to its neighbours and is ready to secure their fulfilment even at the cost of using force. The spearhead of aggression of the West German militarists is directed in the first place against a peace-loving German

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State, against the German Democratic Republic, and other Eastern neighbours. It is well known that the Federal Republic of Germany does not recognize the boundary fixed by the Potsdam Agreement, the Oder-Neisse Line.

For Czechoslovakia, which was one of the first to suffer the consequence of Hitlerite aggression and occupation, it is particularly significant that the Federal Republic of Germany has so far never officially confirmed the invalidity of the Munich Agreement, and that time after time in Western Germany voices are heard at various gatherings of revanchists demanding the absorption of other territories once forcefully occupied by Hitlerite Germany, including the territory of our own country.

For these reasons the West German revanchists consider absolutely unacceptable the conclusion of a non-aggression pact the purpose of which is the consolidation of peace and the stabilization of the situation in Europe.

The danger to which we are drawing attention in this connexion arises not only from the aggressive plans of German militarism themselves, which are unrealistic and doomed in one way or another to failure. The real danger is that any aggression unleashed by German militarism would, as a result of its intrinsic logic, inevitably develop into a general thermonuclear conflict into which the States of the two groups, as well as other countries of the world, would be drawn. Thus German militarism could, as in the past, cause another and this time a far more terrible catastrophe and involve in it its present Western allies. It is surprising that the political leaders of the Western Powers do not want to see all this, but that, on the contrary, they are helping forward the accelerated nuclear armament of their Western German ally while they are fully aware of the political aims pursued by Bonn in carrying out its nuclear armament.

The position taken by the Western Powers in regard to the draft non-aggression pact (ENDC/77) shows that they do not wish to tie their hands and are trying to retain their freedom of action in carrying out their plans. That is the Alpha and Omega of their negative attitude.

The delegation of Czechoslovakia is compelled to note that the continued refusal of the Western Powers to hold a serious and decisive discussion of this important measure is harmful to the cause of peace and world security, and is making more difficult the achievement of the aims set before our Committee.

Mr. CAVALLERFI (Italy) (translation from French): I can only regret that once again we should have heard from the Czechoslovak representative a statement which is highly polemical and offensive to the Western Powers. I have already said here repeatedly that our negotiations cannot be pushed forward by casting such baseless and unjust aspersions on the policy of the Western countries. It is precisely because of the serious nature of our work that my delegation regularly refrains from answering these tiresome and empty charges.

But I should like to concentrate on the statement of the Romanian representative, who raised (supra, p. 5) -- rightly, at this stage of our discussion -- the question of the very nature of the measures included in today's agenda. His remarks on the subject were very interesting, and I shall study them with great care in the verbatim record, particularly since he was good enough to quote several times from statements by Italian politicians. For the moment I should like to make some very brief preliminary remarks suggested by the Romanian representative's statement, while apologizing for having to do so impromptu with none of the necessary documents at my disposal.

I think that for a proper understanding of the nature and purport of collateral disarmament measures it is worth while -- and even necessary -- to refer to the historical background of the question.

Since the 1960 Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee the Western delegations have been trying to start serious negotiations on a few preliminary partial or initial disarmament measures, naturally without prejudice to the framing of the treaty on general and complete disarmament. Basing themselves on resolution 1373 (XIV) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 20 November 1959, which directed the Ten-Nation Committee to work out "measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament", the Western delegations tried by means of limited but constructive proposals to get a modest start made on disarmament, to lay some of the first stones of the edifice of complete disarmament. The Western delegations, for instance, proposed initial concrete measures which might really have begun to allay the mutual distrust and lead us "towards the goal of general and complete disarmament".

The Ten-Nation Committee then found itself in a serious deadlock because of the Eastern delegations' refusal to engage in such a task on the pretext that the Committee's sole function was to prepare a treaty on general and complete disarmament and that any other work would be a sheer waste of time. Those delegations then, as is well known, unilaterally withdrew from the Geneva Conference.

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The difficulties we had met with were therefore taken to the United Nations General Assembly for, as it were, arbitration. The question was whether or not the Disarmament Conference could attempt to reach agreements on limited but constructive measures as first steps towards complete disarmament -- measures such as those proposed by the Western Powers -- or whether the Conference should refuse to examine such proposals and concentrate on the task -- admittedly a colossal one -- of framing a treaty on general and complete disarmament, which obviously calls for protracted and very difficult negotiations. In 1961 the United Nations decided that partial disarmament measures could and should be worked out by the new negotiating body which had been set up, the Eighteen-Nation Committee (A/RES/1722 (XVI)).

According to the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations, which was framed at that time,

"efforts to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total programme and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that programme". (ENDC/5, p.3)

That is, in a way, our work charter for the measures that are now called "collateral". They are in fact initial and partial measures which should be of a concrete and tangible nature and really, while modest and limited, be the first stones in the edifice of disarmament. Why modest and limited? Because, although we should obviously like to achieve total disarmament rapidly, we know that such a desire is unrealistic and that there are immense difficulties which will take time and patience to overcome.

But we do think that modest and limited measures can be worked out by mutual agreement easily and rapidly, or at least without too much difficulty. The very nature of these measures and the background of the subject confirm the two basic characteristics we must always bear in mind: limited scope and relative simplicity.

What, on the other hand, is in the mind of the Soviet delegation? Speaking of collateral measures at our one hundred and twenty-seventh meeting, Mr. Tsarapkin said:

"... the main task we must set about accomplishing without delay is to carry out decisive and radical measures, because at present you will not be able to stop or slow down the movement of the world towards the abyss of war with petty trifles. Here decisive and radical measures ... are needed." (ENDC/PV.127, p.30)

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

That seems to conflict with the nature of collateral measures as it clearly emerges from the texts and from precedents. None of us is refusing to frame decisive and radical measures, if they are possible. Far from it. But the taking of such decisions was not the task of the Committee of the Whole earlier, and is not the task now of the Conference itself when collateral measures are on the agenda. If we want to make progress on collateral measures, the Committee must realize that here it must not set its sights too high. We must aim at something within easy reach in order to bring about an immediate improvement in the international situation and a lessening of tension. It is essential that mutual confidence be rapidly restored, at least in part, by such measures.

That is why the Italian delegation attaches the greatest importance to the framing of collateral measures and hopes that the Committee will speedily reach agreement on this question. But it can do so only if collateral measures are kept within their own proper limits.

Mr. CHRISTOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): As members of the Committee entrusted with a task of exceptional importance, we have always to bear in mind the actual political background to our activities. For obvious reasons which need no stressing, our discussions, far from helping to improve the international climate, are directly or indirectly affected by its negative development.

The policy followed by the governments of the Western countries has a twofold negative effect on disarmament problems: in the Committee itself, where it takes the form of the -- to say the least -- disheartening attitudes of the United States and United Kingdom delegations, and outside the Committee, in the vast plans of these two countries for resuming the ever less restrained arms race.

In our view, the root of the deep concern, the anxiety, nay the pessimism, lately displayed over disarmament is not the difficulties, great as they may be, in the disarmament problem itself. It is the daily widening gap between our Committee's objective -- that is to say, general and complete disarmament and the contrary trends in the policies of the Governments of the United States and its NATO allies.

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

What characterizes the present situation and arouses the anxiety of the whole world, what is preventing the Committee from making any progress, is in no wise the difficulties of its task; it is the unprecedented arms race, which in recent months has been speeded up by the United States and its attendant countries. This is the situation responsible for the fact that there has to be almost more talk in the Committee about the arms race than about disarmament itself.

I am well aware, in all humility, that what I have just said has never been lost on anyone here. All the delegations of the socialist countries have brought up and vigorously denounced the crazy arms race to which the United States is daily imparting a more disturbing tempo. I shall therefore make no mention of astronomical military budgets, of the immense amount of intellectual and technical labour and economic resources devoted to research in modern weapons and their manufacture and improvement. It might perhaps be objected that such activities have ever been inseparable from international life -- as the United Kingdom representative tried to explain this morning. But may I stress what everyone knows: that the United States does not stop at manufacturing and stockpiling nuclear weapons on its national territory, but is becoming the main supplier of nuclear weapons to the Western world.

I quite see what the United States delegation's reply might be: that this is not true, that the United States keeps for itself the right to press the nuclear button, and so on. I think there is no point in examining the value of such objections. From everything that has been said and repeated here and outside the Committee about multilateral, multinational and inter-allied forces and about nuclear warheads in Western Germany and elsewhere, it has become perfectly plain that no one is deceived concerning the nature of the process. Despite the camouflage used in an attempt to conceal it, the whole purpose is the dissemination of nuclear weapons. And this is precisely the aspect of the arms race that is generally regarded today as the most serious threat to peace. The anxiety this fact arouses is the major concern of all those who throughout the world have the courage to look reality in the face and to say honestly what they see.

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

In the brief statements that have followed the submission three days ago of the declaration of the five Latin-American countries (ENDC/87), several speakers have emphasized the importance and the seriousness of this problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. I would quote in particular the representative of Burma, who said:

"The proliferation of nuclear weapons confronts mankind with the gravest of dangers." (ENDC/FV.128, p.20)

The representative of Ethiopia, Lij Mikael Imru, was equally categorical when he said:

"We are convinced that in the course of human development the path of the proliferation of nuclear weapons will inevitably lead to destruction and is a grievous threat to human life and survival." (ibid., p.23)

There is little to add to these words; but I should like to say that we must not forget certain specific facts which aggravate the danger. The spread of nuclear weapons constitutes not only an immediate threat but one hanging as heavily over the future as over the present. Every further dissemination of nuclear weapons must be regarded as an irreversible fait accompli; it is an inevitable -- one is tempted to say an irrevocable -- descent towards the abyss.

Given the gravity of the problem, our view is that among all the collateral measures aimed at lessening international tension and helping forward discussion on general and complete disarmament there is one of cardinal importance. It is the one whose adoption is most likely to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons, that covered by the Soviet delegation's draft declaration on the renunciation of use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75).

The elimination of bases on foreign territory for submarines equipped with nuclear missiles and the other measures referred to in items 2,3 and 4 of the draft declaration are the measures best calculated to stop the dissemination of nuclear weapons, to reduce the risk of war, and in particular accidental war, and thus to facilitate the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

Our delegation would like to comment on the remarks made on this subject by the representatives of Canada and the United States at our meeting of 3 May. The statements made by Mr. Burns and Mr. Stelle last Friday (ENDC/FV.127, pp.13 et seq; pp.22 et seq) gave us a much more concrete, though much less reassuring, idea of the real reasons behind the Western Powers' intransigent attitude towards this draft.

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

Referring to the Soviet draft declaration, Mr. Burns first of all invoked the idea of a quid pro quo. I think he used that expression twice in an attempt to show that the Soviet draft declaration would be "unilateral". He went on to allege that the adoption of the draft "would clearly lessen the security of the NATO nations, particularly those in Europe". (ibid., p.15).

Let us for a moment examine the two aspects of this argument.

First of all, there is the assertion that the adoption of the draft would upset the balance of the armed forces in Europe. The Bulgarian delegation has already had occasion to emphasize that (ENDC/PV.120, p.24) the idea of the "balance of armed forces" is a concept to which the Western Powers give their own interpretation and that this "balance" has nothing to do with balanced measures of disarmament under point 5 of the United States/USSR Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations submitted on 20 September 1961 (ENDC/5).

We know that the terms "balance of forces" is a key term, a favourite argument, in the Western thesis. Whenever the question of eliminating military bases on foreign territory comes up in our discussions, the Western representatives revert to this theme of the balance of forces, as if the term had a fixed, almost mathematical, value. But that is not so, and the facts are there to demonstrate that this precious "balance" often undergoes certain not uninteresting manipulations.

Only a few months ago Western strategists had us believing that the balance was essentially characterized by the existence of United States bases on foreign territory equipped with Thor and Jupiter missiles. They were even very pleased with their bases and missed no chance of stating that the bases were a solid guarantee of their own and their allies' security and that, in addition, the existence of the bases gave them military advantages.

But for some time now we have been witnessing strange developments. We are told that some of these existing bases are to be eliminated -- to be, of course, replaced by submarines with Polaris missiles, multilateral fleets and so forth. But it is still true that what is at stake here is "balance". There is even a marked eagerness to tip the balance, if I may use the term, in the direction -- to be sure -- of the aggressive strategic interests of certain Western general staffs. That is

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precisely the point that I wanted to make. Why are these same general staffs now in such a hurry to upset a balance of forces that is allegedly immune? Because the only balance concerned is their own balance, a unilateral balance, a one-way balance. Above all because the theory of the balance of forces is a false theory. Because it is false, the United States and their allies are concerned to maintain the world balance on which rest, according to them, world security and peace. They use the theory of the balance of forces, as a Czechoslovak colleague aptly observed the day before yesterday (ENDC/FV.129, p.12), to mask the arms race aimed at securing those strategic and military advantages that are the constant preoccupation of United States policy, a policy which may plunge the world into catastrophe.

There is also the assertion of Mr. Burns (ENDC/FV.127, p.15) that the adoption of the Soviet proposal would "lessen" the security of the European members of NATO, Arguing on the same lines, the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, asserted (*ibid.*, p.26) that the adoption of the Soviet draft declaration would call for the re-deployment of the Western forces, to guarantee that security.

But the Western Powers, and particularly the United States, are now carrying out such a re-deployment, although only a few months ago -- before the final decision was taken to introduce submarines equipped with Polaris missiles in the Mediterranean -- they insisted that they were satisfied with the balance of forces. Are the Western Powers not convinced that this re-deployment of their forces at present will compel other countries to follow suit, that their actions will set off a chain reaction such that the process will never be limited, that there will always be talk of further strategic needs and that, as a result, world security will become increasingly precarious? And, in that event, whose will be the responsibility for that state of affairs?

The representatives of certain Western Powers sometimes endeavour to convince us that the sole aim of their governments' policies is to strengthen peace and that the dissemination of nuclear weapons is a mere act of philanthropy. We have heard them state (ENDC/FV.115, pp.38 et seq.) that the presence in the Mediterranean of submarines equipped with Polaris missiles would be a boon for humanity and the best guarantee of peace.

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

I do not think such assertions call for any comment. But they do reveal a certain state of mind -- one that was expressed more frankly at our meeting on 3 May by the United States representative. In reply to certain remarks made on 26 April by the Soviet delegation regarding military preparations in Western countries (ENDC/PV.125, p.23), Mr. Stelle said:

"What the Soviet representative was speaking of was the fact -- or I should say some of the facts -- of the arms race." (ENDC/PV.127, p.24)

So whatever concerns the military preparations on foot -- re-deployment and reorganization of military forces based on the dissemination of different types of nuclear weapons, in a word all this installation of an enormous military machine -- is, according to Mr. Stelle, no more than a natural and logical part of the arms race. From which it follows that it is equally natural and logical to disseminate nuclear weapons mounted on fixed and mobile bases all over the world to give them to the generals of the Bundeswehr, to bring many countries into the atomic club, and to train multinational crews -- which means thousands of men -- in their use, which is tantamount to increasing a thousandfold the risks of a nuclear cataclysm.

This is not, as might be claimed, a way of trumping up a quarrel over a mere difference of language. We think the difference is one of substance between diametrically-opposed conceptions of disarmament problems, between diametrically-opposed attitudes towards the grave problem of the arms race, a difference mainly characterized by the accumulation and dissemination of nuclear weapons.

This is the difference which, among others, is reflected in the collateral measures before the Committee. The delegations of the socialist countries take the view that collateral measures must never at any time or in any manner sanction the arms race as a normal and natural situation. Their function is, on the contrary, to put an end to it, beginning with its most sinister and most disturbing aspect, which is at the present time the dissemination of nuclear weapons.

Among these measures is one which, together with the Soviet draft declaration I have mentioned, would effectively help to halt the dissemination of nuclear weapons, namely, the proposal for the creation of denuclearized zones. The

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discussion here on 6 May (ENDC/PV.128) was a pointed demonstration of the relevance of the question to our time --- a question which my delegation reserves the right to raise again.

I have to remind the Committee that the day before yesterday, 8 May, was the anniversary of the victory over Hitlerite Germany, a date which, as every year, was marked by great celebrations all over the world. By a coincidence replete with sinister meaning, that anniversary was marked in Federal Germany by the passing of a record military budget amounting to one-third of total revenue. On the same occasion the Minister of Defence of Western Germany announced his Government's decision to introduce a Polaris surface force, stating that this nuclear force would comprise 200 such missiles with a range of 2,500 kilometres and of fantastic accuracy. At the same time the Minister stated that his Government still wished to have mobile land-based intermediate range missiles.

This fact brings dramatically to the fore the dangers inherent in the rearmament of Western Germany for peace in Europe and throughout the world. The establishment of such a dangerous seat of war, so rapidly, in a part of the country which was responsible for unleashing the Second World War also emphasizes the need to adopt the plan for the creation of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe (ENDC/C.1/1).

Only such solutions can bring the dissemination of nuclear weapons to a halt and give real meaning and content to the collateral measures which the Committee is now discussing.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Three months have passed since we assembled here in order to solve the questions set before the Committee. Yet the Committee has not been able to make any progress in solving any of these questions. In fact, it has reached a deadlock. A good deal has already been said about that here; nevertheless one is bound to ask what the trouble is. At one of our last meetings the Soviet delegation pointed out that the answer to this question has to be sought, not here within our

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Committee, but outside it (ENDC/PV.125, p.23). And this answer can easily be found if we take a look at what the Western Powers are doing outside the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

At our meeting on 3 May the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, expressed his dissatisfaction with what he referred to as "a chant of abuse by the Soviet delegation concerning the ... motives" of the Western delegations in considering various questions in the Committee. Mr. Stelle expressed his displeasure at the fact that the Soviet representative paid so much attention to events occurring outside our Committee, and particularly to the military preparations of the Western Powers, which are increasing from year to year. The United States representative observed that such statements of ours --

"... will not dismantle a single missile, will not ground a single bomber, will not destroy a single tank, will not stop a single nuclear weapon test".

(ENDC/PV.127, pp. 22-25)

I think we can agree with Mr. Stelle on that point, since in that sentence he expressed in a concise and lapidary manner the real substance of the policy of the Western Powers, namely, to conduct affairs in such a way so that the disarmament negotiations would continue to remain a sterile logomachy, a futile flow of words. We, however, consider that our showing up of the danger of the policy "from a position of strength", the policy of militarism which is being carried out by the Western Powers, will help us to understand why the disarmament negotiations have reached an impasse, and will help us to find a way out of it.

I should like to say quite frankly to Mr. Stelle that our criticism is highly constructive. It is prompted by the fact that the fate of disarmament is not a matter of indifference to us, because we cannot disregard and pass over in silence the circumstances which are preventing the disarmament negotiations from making progress. On 3 May Mr. Stelle recognized the legitimate right of the Soviet delegation to express its concern regarding the lack of progress in our work (ibid., p.23). We note with satisfaction this evolution in the thinking of the United States representative, and hope that in the future Mr. Stelle will not come out with complaints and lamentations about the critical remarks of the Soviet delegation.

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Such criticism is extremely necessary; after all, the Committee must find out and get a clear idea of the reasons why its work has been sterile and without results in order to know exactly where to look for a way out of the situation. The reason why the Committee, after working for over a year, has accomplished nothing either in the field of disarmament or in the field of cessation of tests, or again in the field of so-called collateral measures, is the armaments race which is being carried on by the Western Powers, or, as Sir Paul Mason said today (supra, p.13), the policy of developing the armed potential.

The great efforts recently made by the Western Powers to spread nuclear weapons among their NATO partners, and above all to equip the West German Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons, reflect the true direction of the policy of the Western Powers which, as everyone realizes, is incompatible with disarmament. The facts of our life show that disarmament, the lessening of international tension and the cessation of nuclear weapon tests are not in keeping with the aims and purposes of the Western Powers. This cannot be ignored if we wish to evaluate correctly the reasons for the unsatisfactory state of affairs with regard to disarmament.

At a previous meeting Mr. Stelle expressed the view that representatives of great and strong nations had no need to resort to shrill accusations (ENDC/PV.127, p.23). It is easy to understand that Mr. Stelle would like very much that we should not express any disapproval of the policy "from a position of strength", the policy of militarism, which is being carried on by the Western Powers, and the reflection of which in the Committee is the concept defended by them of military balance in the particular sense in which they understand this term. But any attempt to hush up these negative and extremely dangerous phenomena, which increase the threat of a nuclear missile war, could only do harm to the cause of peace and the security of the peoples. We must all be vigilant in this regard and sound the alarm in respect of these facts and, of course, not lull the peoples with the monotonous droning of speeches on various theories, concepts and approaches while the armaments race and, with it, the threat of a nuclear missile war continue to grow.

Although Mr. Stelle expressed obvious displeasure that the representative of the Soviet Union was introducing into our negotiations elements of candid criticism regarding the real aims of the policy of the Western Powers, he by no means dispelled our doubts regarding the real aims of the policy of the United States and

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its Western allies. There has come about in the world a very strong conviction that the United States and its NATO partners do not really want agreement on any single question. On the contrary, they are afraid of success in the work of the Committee, since it would obviously lead to a lessening of international tension, which would undoubtedly make it difficult for the Western Powers to carry out further military preparations and build up their military potential at the same rate as at present.

In general it is impossible to get a proper understanding of the moves and manoeuvres of the Western delegations in the Committee, unless one takes into consideration their actions outside it. How, for example, can we understand or explain the refusal of the Western Powers to consider in the Eighteen-Nation Committee the question of concluding a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries, unless we analyse the international policy of the Western Powers and their actions outside the Committee, which reflect that policy? The refusal of the United States and the other Western Powers to consider the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact (ENDC/77) is highly significant in revealing the reluctance of the Western Powers to help towards normalizing and stabilizing the present international situation, since this would lead to a lessening of tension in the international situation, which would upset their military and political aims and plans.

In fact, if we judge by deeds and not by words, the whole policy of the Western Powers is now subordinated to a single aim; to create a NATO nuclear force and complete the organization of this force as quickly as possible. All this is clearly seen in all the political actions of the Western countries. In recent days and weeks the feverish bustle over plans for the creation of this force seems to have reached its culmination. And, of course, it is not on the problems of peace and security that the attention of the Governments of the Western Powers is focussed at the present time. The minds of the political leaders of the West are concerned with a different matter: how to prepare most effectively for the forthcoming Ottawa meeting of the NATO Council in this month of May, with which the militaristic circles of the Western Powers link their plans for the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force with the participation of the West German revanchists.

These facts are the best guide for a correct evaluation of the situation. They show that precisely the preparation of the Ottawa meeting of NATO has determined the political moves and manoeuvres of the Western Governments which they have been

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carrying out of late. It suffices to say that during the last six weeks there have been three high-level meetings of representatives of countries belonging to aggressive military blocs. The meeting of NATO representatives in Paris at the end of March was followed by a meeting of the aggressive SEATO bloc. Hardly had the ink dried on the signatures to the documents of this meeting -- which immediately led to a deterioration of the situation in South-East Asia, as in Karachi, capital of Pakistan -- than there was a meeting of the representatives of the countries belonging to CENTO, another military bloc linked to NATO.

This development of events is determined by the very trend of the policy of the Governments of the Western Powers, which is based upon the notorious concept of a policy "from a position of strength". In fact, there is a link between this concept, although its fallaciousness has long been demonstrated, and the theoretical arguments of the representatives of the Western Powers on the necessity of maintaining the balance of forces. It is with arguments on the balance of forces that they cover up their refusal to accept the Soviet proposals aimed at the consolidation of peace, disarmament and the lessening of tension. The representatives of the Western Powers assert without the least hesitation that these proposals are incompatible with the requirements of military balance.

But what is the balance of forces in reality, and where would this concept lead? In fact the formula "balance of forces", as it has been expounded here by the representatives of the Western Powers has nothing to do with disarmament or with measures for strengthening the security of States. It is clearly a militaristic formula having in its various versions one and the same meaning: to justify the retention of huge military forces, to justify the armaments race, and to prevent disarmament.

If we take the trouble to look into the historical background of this problem, we find any number of confirmations of this in the past. In some cases, hidden behind the discussions on maintaining the existing balance of forces was the desire of the strongest imperialist Powers to retain their superiority by maintaining the status quo in armaments so as to ensure their domination in the world. In other cases it was the other way round. Younger imperialist States, striving for world domination, talked about the creation of a "balance of forces" in order to justify their policy of militarism and the armaments race, and tried by referring to balance of forces to cover up their desire to re-divide the world to their advantage. But in every case the final, conclusive act in putting this idea into practice was war, which resulted in the loss of many thousands and even millions of human lives.

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We must all remember that even before the First World War the creation of military alliances, an arms race and militarism were covered up with talk about the balance of forces. And where did this lead? To a world war in which over twenty million people were killed. The balance of forces proved illusory. States which considered themselves done out of their share in the imperialist plunder intensified the arms race still further. They set about creating a new balance of forces in their own favour. In this connexion we might recall, for example, the fate of the Washington Agreements of 1922. Talk about the balance of forces was the funeral dirge at all the disarmament negotiations which took place between the two world wars.

It was precisely as a result of an attempt to combine the maintenance of the balance of forces with disarmament that the disarmament conference convened by the League of Nations more than thirty years ago ended in failure. As is well known, all the plans of the Western Powers at that conference were based on the concept of maintaining the military balance. It was precisely this formula that was seized upon by German militarism which, after the accession of the Hitlerites to power, claimed equality in armaments and, clamouring about the necessity of achieving this equality, rejected the clauses of the Versailles Treaty restricting the armaments of Germany, just as today all the clauses of the Paris Treaty have been completely rejected.

We all know what happened afterwards. The rebuilt German military machine was used by the Hitlerites to attack European States in order to carry out their crazy plans for the establishment of German domination, first over Europe and then over the whole world. This balance of forces has already cost mankind forty million lives. All this shows with the utmost clarity how tragic for mankind has been its experience of the concept of the balance of forces. In reality, the concept of the balance of forces is intended to serve as a justification for the most arrant militaristic policy. The policy of military balance is an attribute of imperialist rivalry. The policy of military balance is synonymous with the policy "from a position of strength". The concept of the balance of forces is resurrected every time preparation for war is being made; and the more intensive and dangerous the arms race and the more feverish the military preparations become, the more stubbornly the ideologists of militarism talk about the necessity of a balance of forces.

No, peace cannot be built on bayonets. Talk about the necessity of maintaining and consolidating military balance, behind which is concealed the desire to continue the arms race and the preparation of a war, must not be allowed to frustrate the efforts of the peoples towards the consolidation of peace and towards disarmament.

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The representatives of the Western Powers continue to assert that peace today is built on the balance of forces and that no measure in the Committee should affect this balance. Apparently they have deliberately disregarded the indisputable fact that all the forces existing in the world are in constant movement. They are constantly changing. Consequently the balance of forces is also constantly changing. In other words, the military balance today, if we take for at least a moment the point of view of the Western Powers, is already no longer what it was ten years ago and, obviously, not what it will be in five to ten years' time or even sooner.

Moreover, what is specially important is that as a result of this development we have, not increased stability, but on the contrary an ever greater instability of the world situation. The military balance on which peace rests today is even more dangerous and fraught with the possibility of military conflict than it was a few years ago. And there is no doubt that, in the future, peace based on such a balance will become increasingly precarious and insecure until it ends in a catastrophe.

But if the Western Powers had abandoned a few years ago their doctrine of the policy "from a position of strength" and accepted the proposals aimed at achieving peace which were put forward by the Soviet Union, then undoubtedly the world would not have experienced the extremely dangerous crises which we have witnessed in recent years. It is high time the Western Powers realized from the lessons of the past where their policy "from a position of strength", their militarist concept of military balance, and their position of developing and accumulating military potential are leading. We must note with regret that the events of recent years have taught them nothing.

And, as before, we see how any Soviet proposal is assessed by the Western Powers from one point of view only: what military advantages or disadvantages to NATO may result from the implementation of any particular Soviet proposal. It is no mere coincidence that the Western Powers use one approach whenever, according to certain reasons and computations of theirs -- I shall not go into the correctness of these reasons and computations -- they consider that in some particular field they are stronger than the socialist countries. The same Western Powers use a completely different approach in any field in which they think they do not have such military advantages.

The result is a vicious circle. Each new step in the direction of accelerating the armaments race and increasing military forces is declared by the western Powers

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to be a necessary measure either for maintaining the military balance or for developing the military potential or for creating such a balance where it does not yet exist. And all this is done to strengthen the forces of the West. After such measures have been carried out and the armaments and armed forces of the West have been increased, they tell us that this has already become an integral component of the balance of forces on which, according to the assertion of Western politicians, the peace of today is based, and that this balance must not be upset.

This is the real gist of the theory of the balance of forces. It gives the Western Powers a convenient screen behind which they can continue to build up their own armaments and at the same time reject proposals aimed at disarmament and leading to a reduction of the risk of war. We affirm once again that the concept of military balance is the enemy of disarmament. This concept is the favourite child of the merchants of death, the armaments manufacturers. This concept must be rejected as incompatible with disarmament and contrary to the task of lessening international tension and eliminating the threat of a nuclear missile war.

I should now like to dwell on certain objections of the Western Powers to the Soviet proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries. On 3 May the Romanian delegation put the following three questions to the United States delegation:

"1. Is the United States delegation in agreement with the statement made by President Kennedy on 25 November 1961 with regard to the usefulness of a non-aggression pact between the NATO States and the Warsaw Pact States?

2. Which of the provisions contained in the draft pact submitted by the Soviet Union do not suit the Western delegations in general and the United States delegation in particular?

3. Under what conditions does the United States delegation foresee the possibility of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO States and the Warsaw Pact States?" (ENDC/PV.127, p.12)

These questions were asked in order to elucidate the real attitude of the Western Powers towards a non-aggression pact, to establish the reasons for which they refuse to conclude such a pact, to ascertain what in the Soviet draft non-aggression pact does not suit them, and to determine under what conditions the Western Powers would be prepared to agree to the conclusion of such a pact. It cannot be doubted that careful study of these aspects of the problem would help the negotiations to move forward.

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What sort of reply have we had to these questions? First, we must say that not a single one of them has been given a concrete reply. The United States representative repeated a general statement, unsupported by any argument, that this Disarmament Conference is not an appropriate forum for consideration of this purely political matter (ibid., p.26). He also said that the Soviet proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact would only be a reaffirmation of some of the existing obligations of States under the United Nations Charter (ibid.). In uttering this phrase, Mr. Stelle showed that the United States considers the conclusion of a non-aggression pact to be superfluous, because it would be a superfluous reaffirmation of obligations already assumed by States under the United Nations Charter.

With these vague and completely unconvincing arguments the United States representative evades a non-aggression pact. But his Canadian colleague, Mr. Burns, was not so vague in explaining (ibid., p.17) the reasons why the Western Powers are evading a non-aggression pact. As one such reason he stated frankly that the Western Powers do not want to assume an obligation not to attack and not to carry out aggression because, as they believe, there is a problem of boundaries in Europe. May I ask Mr. Burns and his Western colleagues what the boundary problem in Europe is which prevents the Western Powers from assuming a reciprocal obligation of the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries not to attack each other?

For us the answer to this question is perfectly clear. On this question Mr. Burns was the mouthpiece of the West German revanchists. It is they who speak of revising the Oder-Neisse boundary which was drawn after the Second World War as a result of the defeat of the Hitlerite aggressors. It is they who harbour aggressive plans against the German Democratic Republic. These are the official aims of the policy of the German revanchists. They constantly and resolutely oppose the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries, considering -- and certainly not with justification -- that such a pact would be a serious obstacle to the accomplishment of their aggressive plans.

That is why, in making his statement at our meeting of 3 May, Mr. Burns was the mouthpiece of the West German revanchists. Mr. Burns said that the Western Powers cannot assume an obligation not to attack the socialist countries because West Germany has territorial claims and has aggressive aspirations with regard to the German Democratic Republic, aiming at the absorption of this socialist German State by capitalist Western Germany.

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What does this statement of Mr. Burns mean? What alternative to a non-aggression pact are the socialist States to expect? The answer is obvious. The Western Powers, rejecting a non-aggression pact which would lead to the normalization and stabilization of the situation in Europe, show clearly that, in accordance with the demand of the West German revanchists, they want to retain their freedom of action in regard to a military attack in Central Europe. Obviously, if that is the policy of the Western Powers we cannot expect to make any progress on a single one of the questions leading towards the abolition of the armaments race and the reduction of tension in international relations.

I should like to conclude my remarks on this subject by recalling the undoubted fact that a non-aggression pact is the simplest form of obligation between States not to attack each other. A non-aggression pact is the most elementary form of an obligation to live in peace. We call upon the Western Powers to abandon the policy of developing their armed potential about which the United Kingdom representative, Sir Paul Mason, spoke to us today, and concern themselves with serious negotiations and real measures of disarmament.

The United States representative, Mr. Stelle, said:

"Our responsibilities require also that we understand each other's concerns and try to meet those concerns in a manner consistent with the common security."

(ibid., p.29)

Those are very good words; they are full of good sense.

We have just stated our views, our fears and apprehensions with regard to the policy of military balance which the Western Powers are pursuing. We ask the United States delegation and the representatives of the other Western Powers to recognize their responsibility and show comprehension of these fears and apprehensions, which are perturbing not only the socialist countries but also all peace-loving peoples. The Western Powers should respond to this in a manner consistent with the common security.

After all, did you not say so yourself, Mr. Stelle, at our meeting of 3 May? The common security is not ensured by spreading nuclear missiles at foreign bases all over the world. The common security is not ensured by the cruising of nuclear submarines in the Mediterranean and in the seas and oceans around the shores of the socialist countries or roving beneath the Arctic ice-cap in constant readiness to deliver an aggressive nuclear blow. The common security is not ensured by feverish military preparations,

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or by an armaments race, or by the conclusion of new agreements laying down in legal form the aggressive preparations of the Western Powers. All this only increases the danger of attack and the threat of a nuclear missile war, and makes the security of the peoples depend on the growth of armaments. All this obliges the peace-loving peoples to take measures to strengthen their defence capabilities.

But we must state categorically that the armaments race and military preparations which are being forced upon the world by the Western Powers are certainly not the way to ensure the peace and the security of the peoples. What the Western Powers consider to be security is like the security of a man sitting on a powder keg with a lighted cigarette. Only real disarmament measures, only the renunciation by States of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons, only the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO States and the Warsaw Treaty States, only the creation of denuclearized zones in various regions of the world and particularly in Europe -- only an agreement on the implementation of these measures can ensure genuine security for the peoples.

Mr. Stelle said that we ought to understand --

"... each other's concerns and try to meet those concerns in a manner consistent with the common security."

He continued:

"Those words are easy to say. The performance calls for statesmanship.

The all-important element is the will to make the effort". (ENDC/PV.127, p.29)
Yes, you are quite right, Mr. Stelle. Your words call for deeds and statesmanship. You are also right in saying that the all-important element in this situation is the will to make the effort. We appeal to the Western Powers, and above all to the United States, to give evidence of statesmanship and foresight and to make an effort so as to move the business of disarmament out of the impasse.

The adoption of the Soviet proposals contained in the draft declaration (ENDC/75), and the adoption of the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO States and the Warsaw Treaty States (ENDC/77), would be the way which could at once strengthen to a high degree the peace and the security of the peoples. The Western Powers must take this way and as quickly as possible, if they wish to save the world from the catastrophe of a nuclear missile war.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): I have two more speakers on my list, and I wish also to make a few remarks as representative of Poland.

Mr. RAE (Canada): My delegation has listened with the closest interest and attention to the discussion this morning, and in particular to the comments on the views expressed by the head of the Canadian delegation on 3 May (ENDC/PV.127, pp.13 et seq.). We shall be examining with the utmost care the comments made, particularly, by the representatives of Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, and we reserve the right to revert to them at an appropriate time. I should, however, like to make just one or two very brief observations now concerning the burden of Mr. Burns's statement on 3 May.

The representative of Bulgaria referred particularly to the comments of the head of the Canadian delegation on the Soviet Union draft declaration on the renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75). The Canadian delegation found that draft declaration wanting on a number of grounds, but essentially on the ground that it did not fulfil the principle contained in paragraph 5 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5) that the disarmament measures should be balanced so that no nation can obtain a military advantage over another through their implementation. Mr. Burns said that that principle applied both to general disarmament and to collateral measures.

A number of representatives, including those of Romania, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, have drawn attention in particular to Mr. Burns's comments (ENDC/PV.127, pp.17-19) on the Soviet Union draft (ENDC/77) of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries. While refraining from offering comments on the specific provisions of the Soviet Union draft, Mr. Burns pointed out that those who proposed such a pact in this Conference themselves believed that the matter was directly connected with general European political questions. He said it was the Canadian view that such questions were beyond the immediate scope of this Conference, but that "a non-aggression pact at some point may possibly be appropriate in the context of an East-West understanding on those broader questions." (ibid., p.18). His principal point was that the pact as proposed was not conceived merely as a collateral measure to general and complete disarmament, but was "closely related to very far-reaching and extremely important political problems of a different character". "For that reason," he concluded, "many members of this Conference consider that the Soviet proposal should be considered in a forum other than the Eighteen-Nation Committee." (ibid., p.19).

(Mr. Rae, Canada)

The question is not whether or not -- as the representative of Romania has posed it (supra, p.11) -- these important political problems are to be solved by way of aggression or non-aggression. Our devotion to peaceful solutions and our respect for the obligations which we have assumed under the Charter are clear-cut and are the answer to that question. The question to which Mr. Burns addressed himself was a different one, namely, whether this forum was the proper forum for a substantive discussion of these very complicated political questions.

As I have said earlier, I reserve the right of our delegation to make further comment on these points at a later stage.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): The representative of Romania began his remarks this morning by saying (supra, p.5) that once upon a time -- if ever -- there was a common understanding in our Committee on what we talk about when we discuss collateral measures. He recalled for us the agreement of the Conference that in discussing collateral measures we should be discussing implementation of measures aimed at

"the lessening of international tension; the consolidation of confidence among States; and facilitating general and complete disarmament". (ENDC/1/Add. 1)

The Romanian representative used some remarks of my delegation in an attempt to make a case that we were trying to re-define that agreement of the Conference on what we talk about when we discuss collateral measures. My delegation attaches great importance to that definition -- at which we have reason to be gratified, as the Italian representative has pointed out -- because we think that it was an agreement to which our Eastern colleagues were brought only after traditional opposition. We should not wish to re-define collateral measures, and I must submit that in the remarks of mine which the Romanian representative quoted I was not re-defining what we should discuss when we discuss collateral measures. I was referring to the proposal for a NATO-Warsaw non-aggression pact, and I said:

"... I should like to comment on the professed unhappiness of the Soviet and other Eastern delegations with the position of my Government that this Disarmament Conference is not an appropriate forum for consideration of that purely political matter." (ENDC/PV.127, p.26)

I went on to say:

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

"The world is filled with political problems and there is urgent need for their solution. But can it realistically be contended that this Conference is to be the forum for solution of each and every one of the world's political problems?" (ibid., p.27)

And I suggested that if we did attempt to turn this Conference into a general political conference, we should be reducing our attention to disarmament.

I was not re-defining our agreement on what we should consider under collateral measures. I was saying quite simply what our position is: that we realize that political solutions will, of course, contribute to disarmament, but that we must make a judgement on what we can most usefully discuss here. And it is the judgement of my Government that a NATO-Warsaw pact cannot usefully be discussed in this particular forum.

When the Romanian representative asks who is re-defining collateral measures, I think he should turn his attention to his colleague from the Soviet Union; for when we put forward admittedly modest and admittedly limited proposals, which have the merit, we believe, that they should be acceptable to both sides, and should have an effect in reducing tension, our Soviet colleague replies, as he did at last Friday's meeting, that those measures cannot --

"bring any relief ... eliminate the threat of war, eliminate the threat of aggression" (ibid., p.30).

Obviously we do not submit that the measures we propose can eliminate the danger of a thermonuclear war. They are measures which we believe are useful, and we put them forward in the spirit of the definition of collateral measures agreed on by the Committee. When the Soviet representative turns down all such modest and limited measures on the ground that they do not eliminate the threat of thermonuclear war, he is obviously decrying the value of any limited measures at all. So we ask the Romanian representative to question the Soviet representative on what is now his definition of the collateral measures which we are supposed to discuss in this Committee on Fridays.

But, of course, the Soviet representative does not stop there. In our discussions of collateral measures, as well as in our discussions of the test ban and our discussions of general and complete disarmament, he construes our statement that the elimination of the threat of thermonuclear war can only be achieved in the light of and towards the end of general and complete disarmament to mean that the United States does not have the objective of eliminating the threat of nuclear war. The hollowness of that

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

argument is apparent. We do have the objective of general and complete disarmament. We do have the objective of the elimination of the threat of thermonuclear war. We realize that the approach must be practical and realistic, and that the problem is complex. The Soviet representative has no grounds, as he well knows, for saying that, because we state clearly the complexity and the difficulty of the general problem, we do not want to solve it.

But when that theme is played out the Soviet representative embarks on other diversionary themes in our Conference, no matter what the subject of discussion. He launches into, or summons his allies into, a sterile game of follow-the-leader in attacks on the policies of the Federal Republic of Germany. Those attacks against a truly democratic State which has integrated itself into the free defensive community of the West, and which has formally and solemnly pledged to achieve its national objectives by peaceful means only, tend to be as vitriolic as they are unjustified. But they merely divert us from our work.

When that theme is played out, the Soviet representative launches into what is perhaps his favourite theme -- the guilt of the United States and the West for the arms race. He attacks the necessary precautions and preparations which the United States and its allies are undertaking and will undertake in order to carry out self-defence and collective defence. He ignores, as our United Kingdom colleague pointed out today (supra, p.14), the strenuous efforts of the Soviet Union to develop its military power. We are in an arms race; we shall stay there until we achieve at least a beginning on disarmament. But the Soviet Union is intensively and intimately engaged in that race, and it does no good to attempt to lay the burden of that unhappy circumstance upon the United States and the West.

Today, in pursuit of this theme, Mr. Tsarapkin launched a general attack -- a familiar attack -- against what he called the doctrine of the balance of power or the balance of forces. He was referring, of course, to our simple statement that in disarmament we have to start from things as they actually are, or, in the unhappy event that disarmament is not speedily initiated, from things as they may be at that time. But Mr. Tsarapkin assailed the United States and the West for what he described as "a concept of starting from a balance of power or a balance of forces". He said that such a concept was a foe of disarmament and, as I heard it over the interpretation, that it was propounded only by "merchants of death" (supra, p.38).

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

We recognize the unhappy fact that we are in an arms race; we recognize that the other side is also in that arms race, and disarmament must start from the fact that at present there is a balance of forces — a balance of power.

A more authoritative representative of the Soviet Union has in effect endorsed the Western position on a balance of power, or a balance of forces. I should like to recall to the Committee a statement made by Premier Khrushchev on 22 February 1963. Premier Khrushchev said:

"If peace is preserved at the present time, it is first of all because there exists the USSR and the comity of socialist countries, which have a rapidly-growing economy and surpass the capitalist camp in armaments and armed forces. However, if we cease to pay attention to our defensive capacity, then the balance of power can change, not to our advantage."

Again, in a conversation on 23 April 1963 with the director of an Italian newspaper, Mr. Khrushchev referred to talks on subjects which included disarmament, and said:

"Their starting point is the balance of power which has developed in the world today."

It is an unhappy fact that each side has to look after its own interests in perfecting its defence and in perfecting collective defence until such time as there is a real safeguarded agreement at least initiating disarmament. It does no good to quarrel with that unhappy fact or, particularly, to attempt to shift all the burden of it to one side and then truly to waste the time of the Conference in propaganda speeches to that end.

Mr. Tsarapkin once said that he believed this Conference was a waste of time (ENDC/PV.126, p.24). The United States delegation does not believe it is a waste of time. We believe we have a highly complex and difficult but vastly important task, and we do not think we are wasting our time in engaging in it. It is a waste of time to divert our efforts by senseless and unwarranted attacks on the motives of the other side. I hope that we may move forward in constructive work.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland)(translation from French): I crave the Committee's permission to make a few remarks as representative of Poland. My remarks concern the statement made by Mr. Burns, representative of Canada, at the one hundred and twenty-seventh meeting; and I wish to make them because I think that the Canadian delegation, which will wish to reply at some later meeting to all comments on this question, should also know my delegation's views.

(The Chairman, Poland)

The members of the Committee will recall that I have already had occasion (ENDC/PV.127, p.19) to thank Mr. Burns for finally explaining (ibid., pp.17-19) the reasons why the Western Powers oppose discussion of the Soviet proposal for a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty (ENDC/77). We now know where we stand. Nevertheless, I think that the arguments advanced on that occasion by the Canadian representative call for a reply.

I shall begin by agreeing with Mr. Burns that the conclusion of such a pact is linked with the political problems of the European continent. I have often said so myself, and I stand by what I have said. At the same time I think that Mr. Burns is wrong in deducing that we are thereby not entitled to discuss the subject in this Committee. A moment ago the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, took up the same theme, quoting from one of his recent statements to the effect that there are many political problems in the world and that it is not our task to solve these problems here (supra, p. 44). I agree with him. Incidentally, I myself said in one of my statements on the question before us that a non-aggression pact would not solve outstanding political problems. But, I repeat, I think that the Western representatives are wrong to try, on that premise, to convince us that we should not discuss a non-aggression pact in this Committee.

Let us first look at the question from the procedural angle. Our Committee does include the main parties to the Warsaw Treaty and to the North Atlantic Treaty. There are, of course, some absentees; but that holds for both parties. I hope that the signing of a non-aggression pact will be attended by all States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and all States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty; but for the moment it would be hard to imagine a more representative body than this to prepare a text.

I do not know whether the Western Powers have any objections to the presence of representatives of the non-aligned countries at the discussion of the draft pact in the Committee. If so, we should deeply regret it. We ourselves are convinced that the non-aligned countries, like all other countries in the world, are equally concerned that relations between the two most powerful military and political blocs facing each other today should be based on the principle of non-aggression and the

(The Chairman, Poland)

peaceful settlement of disputes. We are also convinced that the representatives of the non-aligned countries can make a useful contribution to the solution of the problems connected with the conclusion of such a pact.

Now let us return to questions of substance. The Canadian representative does not seem to be opposed in principle to the signing of a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. That fact we welcome. But we find it impossible to accept the conditions that the Canadian representative would lay down. Mr. Burns says:

"... the pact proposed by the Soviet Union is not conceived merely as a measure collateral to general and complete disarmament but is also closely related to very far-reaching and extremely important political problems of a different character." (ENDC/PV.127, p.19)

That is why, he says --

"In the Canadian view a non-aggression pact at some point may possibly be appropriate in the context of an East-West understanding on those broader questions." (ibid., p.18)

I think that our United Kingdom colleague supported the same viewpoint this morning when he said (supra, p.16) that a non-aggression pact might be concluded when East-West relations improved to the point where such a pact could crown a general process of détente. I must state that the Polish delegation cannot accept such a point of view. We fail to see why the conclusion of a non-aggression pact should be subject to the application of other measures. We cannot understand why a mutual non-aggression pledge should depend on the solution of other problems. We cannot conceive a pledge not to resort to force and to settle all differences by negotiation that will stand only if agreement is reached on wider issues.

Am I to conclude that the West rejects the absolute and unconditional nature of a non-aggression pledge, a pledge to settle disputes peacefully and to prohibit the use of force, which are principles at the root of the modern international order? Am I right in concluding that its opposition to the signing of a non-aggression pact is explained by its unwillingness to help to stabilize and normalize relations in Europe, which would mean acceptance of the political and legal situation arising out of the defeat of Hitlerite Germany and subsequent developments in Central Europe

(The Chairman, Poland)

which resulted in the creation of two German States? Am I to understand that the Western Powers, in objecting to discussion of the Soviet draft non-aggression pact, refuse to recognize the existing state of affairs in Europe, thereby supporting the vengeful policy of the Bonn Government, whose main objective is to change the status quo in Europe?

These questions call for clear-cut replies, because on them depend in the last resort, not only the fate of a discussion on the non-aggression pact, but also the very future of all our Committee's activities and even the future of world peace.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I should like to exercise my right of reply to the remarks made by the United States representative.

First, I should like to give an explanation, so that there may be no ambiguity in connexion with Mr. Stelle's remarks regarding military balance (supra, p.45). I must say when we use the term "military balance" we are referring to the concrete aspect of the present state of an armed world. The difference between our conception and that of the United States is that we propose to put an end to this state of an armed world and set about real disarmament measures, whereas the United States conception of military balance is aimed not at disarmament, but at the further development of the military potential -- as Sir Paul Mason said, at the further development of the arms race. This follows directly from what Mr. Stelle is always saying. He often says in his speeches that we must recognize with regret that the present situation is such that an arms race cannot be avoided.

Here is the difference. We are in favour of going over to disarmament measures, but you are against this, and say that any disarmament, any real disarmament, would upset the existing military balance. You now propose that we limit ourselves to trivial measures. You call them more nobly, "modest". You propose that we limit ourselves to such measures as an exchange of missions and similar measures which do not affect armaments or do not affect, as you say, the military balance.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

No one is prohibited from using the term "military balance". But for what purpose is it used? If and when we use the term "military balance", it is only to describe the present concrete state of an armed world, and we propose to start disarmament; but you speak of a conception of military balance which, as is evident from all your statements, is preventing us from setting about real disarmament. That is the difference.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): In exercising my right of reply to the reply of the Soviet representative, I merely wish to say -- and perhaps I should be a little less than frank if I did not say it, particularly in the light of his reply -- that my delegation is quite content to rest upon the record.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and thirtieth plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Blusztajn, representative of Poland.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Romania, the United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Canada, the United States and Poland.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 13 May 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.40 p.m.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.130/Corr.1

2 July 1963

ENGLISH only

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

AUG 26 1963

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

CORRIGENDUM TO THE
FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTIETH MEETING

Page 39, 3rd paragraph, 8th line, instead of:

"- and certainly not with justification -"

read:

"- and certainly not without justification -"

